



















ABSTRACT:  We introduce stereotype threat in a signaling model.  The novel feature of our model is 
that we allow the worker to choose his productivity, but we tie this choice to a cost which is given by his 
unobservable type.  It is this additional choice which gives rise to multiple pooling equilibria.  The 
existence of multiple equilibria, which generate a stereotype threat effect, is shown to be more likely if 
there is less variance in the distribution of types, if the signal has more value to the firm, or if the single-
crossing-property is more pronounced.  We also show that a very bad stereotype forces a high-
productivity worker with that bad stereotype to separate and, thereby, engage in counter-stereotypical 
behaviour.  In this way the high-productivity worker from a very discriminated against label overtakes a 
complacent pooling worker with a good stereotype label.  We extend our model to several productivities 
and show that stereotype threat can exist along with counter-stereotypical behaviour even when beliefs 
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I.  Introduction 
  Stereotype threat has been an important topic for psychology researchers since Rosenthal and 
Jacobson’s (1968) seminal work “Pygmalion in the Classroom,” which analyzes how completely random 
information about student ability told to teachers at the beginning of the school-year becomes self-
fulfilling.
1  Although provocative, self-fulfilling stereotypes suggest a uniformity of experience within 
each group.  There is, however, large within group variation that self-fulfilling stereotypes cannot explain 
by themselves.  For example, although women receive lower average pay than men, and may still suffer 
forms of discrimination, they receive 58% of the bachelor’s degrees that are granted in the U.S. each year.  
Furthermore, Lang and Manove (2011) report that when controlling for ability, as measured on the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), African-American women of all abilities but the lowest receive more 
education than white women and African-American men of all abilities but the lowest and highest receive 
more education than white men.  Still, the earnings of African-American men are lower than whites at 
intermediate education levels (a parallel result for women is impeded by selection issues).  In addition, for 
many immigrant groups one subset performs much better than the native born population while another 
set languishes behind.  The above examples suggest that although a group may suffer discrimination a 
subset of that group may counter their stereotype by obtaining extra education.  In this paper we start by 
providing intuitive conditions for self-fulfilling stereotypes to occur and we then show how this counter-
stereotypical behaviour can exist along with stereotype threat. 
  We employ the following structure.  People differ in several dimensions, some of which are un-
observable.  One thing that is observable is an unalterable marking that we call a label.  The label refers to 
the worker’s caste, ethnic origin, eye color, gender, or skin color.  In addition to a label the worker is 
endowed with a type, which is his private information.  During his formative years, the worker chooses 
his lifetime productivity.  It is costly to become high productivity and this type dependent cost depends on 
                                                      
1 Eden (1992), and Dvir et al. (1995) show that the Pygmalion effect can exist in the workplace as well as the 
classroom.  The self-fulfilling prophecy can also occur even if the teacher, or the boss, do not take any actions.  For 
example, simply reminding test takers of their race before a test can affect results on standardized tests (Steele and 
Aronson, 1995).  This stereotype threat is also demonstrated with respect to gender and entrepreneurship by Gupta et 
al. (2008), and gender and math performance by Good (2008) and Kiefer (2007).   
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the worker’s natural ability as well as his nurturing environment.  Productivity is unobservable to the firm 
when they hire the worker, however, the worker may use an additional signal (such as university 
education) to inform the firm of his chosen productivity.  For the worker, the only reason to become high 
productivity is because it lowers the cost of the additional signal.   
  The novel feature of our model is the endogenous productivity choice.  We analyze how this 
choice is affected by label-specific stereotypes that interact with the worker’s ability to signal his 
productivity and we show that this heuristic process can become self-fulfilling.  Although the label is not 
correlated with the unknown parameters in any fundamental way the incentive effects of the stereotype 
correctly correlates them in equilibrium.  The label then provides statistical information to the firm who 
engages in statistical discrimination.   
  In analyzing this framework we consider sequential equilibrium, however, as is well known, they 
do not restrict beliefs off of the equilibrium path and many sequential equilibrium are not credible.  That 
is, certain equilibria only exist because someone has an incredible out-of-equilibrium belief.  We, 
therefore, define a credible equilibrium as a sequential equilibrium that satisfies a dominance refinement 
on beliefs.  With two productivities this dominance refinement yields a unique separating equilibrium but 
it does not rule out pooling equilibria that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium and we analyze 
both types of un-dominated equilibria.
2  It is the juxtaposition between the pooling equilibria, which may 
exhibit stereotype threat, and the strategic separating-equilibrium response to a very discriminatory belief 
that is at the heart of our paper.  
  If certain conditions are satisfied, then multiple un-dominated pooling equilibria exist.  In this 
case, as the required pooling signal increases a larger measure of types will choose high productivity.  
Hence, for one label there exists a pooling equilibrium with a low stereotype and a low pooling 
                                                      
2 There are stronger refinements, some of which leave only a unique separating equilibrium with just two 
productivities.  We are interested in both pooling and separating equilibrium and especially the comparison between 
them.  A dominance refinement is, therefore, the simplest way to isolate the equilibria of interest.  Furthermore, 
there are criticisms of these stronger refinements (which we discuss in section II.B), however, none are directed at 
dominance refinements.  In addition, we extend our model to several productivities in section III and show that 
multiple pooling equilibria, stereotype threat, and counter-stereotypical behavior can occur with equilibrium 
dominance and the intuitive criterion which is the most commonly used stronger refinement.   
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expenditure and for another label there exists a pooling equilibrium with a high stereotype and a high 
pooling expenditure.  The first contribution of our analysis is showing that these un-dominated, self-
fulfilling, statistical discrimination equilibria are more likely to occur if there is less variance in the 
distribution of types, the signal is more valuable to the firm, or if the sorting condition is more 
pronounced.  Hence, stereotype threat is predicted to be more likely to occur when natural ability is less 
diverse or when university education is more important for job performance.  Although obtained in a 
particular framework we expect these results to hold more generally.   
  Our second contribution results from analyzing stereotype threat in a signaling model.  Existing 
models of self-fulfilling statistical discrimination assume that productivity is imperfectly observed and 
potential signals (such as university transcripts) are not observed.  In signaling models productivity is 
unobservable, but the signal is perfectly observed.  We use the information structure of the signaling 
model to show that stereotype threat can occur even when a potentially separating signal is present. 
  A very low pooling stereotype implies a very low pooling wage so that a high productivity agent 
would separate and break this low stereotype (and dominated) pooling equilibrium.  A label that suffers 
from a very low pooling stereotype will, ex post, end up in the separating equilibrium which has a higher 
probability of a high productivity worker.  The following situation is then possible.  A high productivity 
worker with a moderate or high stereotype label will pool at a moderate or high level of the signal and a 
high productivity worker with a low stereotype label will engage in counter-stereotypical behaviour and 
separate himself with an even higher level of the signal.  Furthermore, the good stereotype can generate 
complacency and a reputational Dutch disease effect, whereby a worker with a moderate stereotype label 
has less reason to distinguish himself and he remains content in the pooling equilibrium.  In particular, it 
is the strategic behaviour of the high quality worker with a very discriminated against label that generates 
his high achievement.  Identification of this counter-stereotypical behaviour is our third contribution.   
  When there are three productivities it is possible that all three pool with a good stereotype but that 
the highest separates (leaving the others to pool) when the stereotype is bad.  In this way stereotype threat 
can occur along with counter-stereotypical behaviour.  With more productivities additional variations are, 
of course, possible.  In this way we can provide an explanation for the facts on gender, skin color,   
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education and earnings mentioned in the second paragraph.
3  In addition, with three or more 
productivities our results hold even if we use the more restrictive intuitive criterion belief refinement. 
  Lange (2007) looks at the speed of employer learning and its effect on the economic relevance of 
signaling.  His results suggest that employers learn a lot in the first few years and that there is a modest 
upper bound on the signaling gain from an additional year of schooling.  On the other hand, Bidner 
(2010) shows that credentials can determine a worker’s team assignment.  Since team skills affect the 
individual worker’s productivity measure, the signaling value of credentials may be under estimated.  A 
combination of our results and those in Bidner (2010) suggests that stereotype threat may generate an 
additional overestimation of the speed of employer learning (if some labels amass less of the credentials 
necessary for placement on a good team) and further underestimate the pure signaling effect of education.  
  The pioneering work on self-fulfilling discrimination in an economic environment is Arrow 
(1973).  In his framework, imperfect observability about a worker’s productivity leads employers to offer 
wages based in part on stereotypes about the worker’s label.  When the expected wage affects the 
productivity decision, negative or positive stereotypes can become self-fulfilling.  A somewhat similar 
idea is explored by Phelps (1972), Aigner and Cain (1977), and Lundberg and Startz (1983); however, 
their framework requires that employers have less precise measurements of ability and productivity for 
discriminated against labels.
4  Coate and Loury (1993) build on Arrow’s model to study the effect of 
affirmative action policies in a statistical discrimination model of job assignment, which allows for the 
analysis of this policy’s joint effect on worker incentives and employer beliefs.  We add to the above 
                                                      
3 In Lang and Manove (2011), firms see the worker’s education and they receive a noisy signal about productivity.  
This signal is noisier for blacks of intermediate ability than it is for whites of the same ability.  In this way, blacks 
may suffer statistical discrimination and intermediate ability blacks get more education than whites of the same 
ability, thereby engaging in signaling.  Hence, although the model is different, stereotype threat and a form of 
counter-stereo-typical behavior exist in Lang and Manove (2011) as well.  
4 Fryer (2007) extends Arrow (1973) and Coate and Loury (1993) to a dynamic framework.  His key insight is that 
the first period hiring decision truncates the distribution so that a hired worker from a low self-fulfilling stereotype 
label is of higher potential quality.  Hence, there may be belief flipping so that a hired worker from the low 
stereotype label is more likely to receive a promotion in the second period.  Milgrom and Oster (1987) show that the 
desire to hide what they have learned about a worker’s ability will lead employers to hide some workers with certain 
labels in less visible job assignments.  Coate and Tennyson (1992) make the extension from job assignment to sector 
choice.  They show that discrimination in credit markets may lessen the likelihood of self-employment among 
discriminated against labels.     
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literature in several ways.  First, we identify intuitive conditions on when stereotype threat can occur.  
Second we introduce the concept of counter-stereotypical behaviour.
5  Third, we show that statistical 
discrimination can occur even when a worker can affect the information that a firm receives by the choice 
of a perfectly observable, and potentially separating, signal.  It is this signal itself that generates 
stereotype threat.  Fourth, introducing stereotype threat in a signaling model allows for an alternative 
analysis of affirmative action.   
  In the next section we develop our model with two productivity choices.  In the third section we 
consider additional productivities along with the more restrictive intuitive criterion belief refinement.  
Conclusions are in the fourth section. 
II.  A Model 
A. The Economic Environment 
  We consider the interaction between a single worker and one firm.  The worker begins by 
choosing his productivity: q  {l, h}.  Productivity is not observable by the firm when they hire the 
worker.  High productivity requires an additional expenditure that depends on the worker’s type: θ.  The 
worker has private information about his type, which is drawn from a continuously differentiable and 
commonly known log-concave distribution function F().  The lower bound of the distribution, θ, is 
nonnegative.
6  The worker also has an unalterable label, i  {A, B, C, …}, which corresponds to his race, 
or sex, or caste, etc.  It is common knowledge that the label contains no direct information, in the sense 
that the distribution of types is independent of i: F(|i) = F() for all i.  The label may, however, provide 
information about the worker’s unobservable productivity choice.  The common stereotype about the 
worker’s label is denoted as Pr(h|i) = i.  After observing their type and label, the worker chooses his 
unobservable productivity, q and an additional expenditure, s  
+, which may enhance his productivity 
                                                      
5 As opposed to counter-stereotypical behavior, Feltovich et al. (2002) consider counter-signaling.  In their model, 
with three types and noisy additional information on quality, the middle type separates but the highest type’s 
expected payoff is greater if they rely on the additional information and do not choose a separating signal level.   
6 Examples of log-concave distribution functions with a non-negative support are the Pareto, uniform, exponential, 
gamma, chi-squared, power, log normal, and Weibull.  The logistic and normal distributions are log-concave, 
however, their support includes negative numbers.   
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as well as signal his chosen quality.  
Our idea is the following.  The worker’s productivity is determined by choices the worker makes 
during his formative years and is partially related to his primary and secondary education.  The cost of 
these choices is determined by the worker’s ability, family, and neighborhood.  These naturally vary and a 
given worker has superior information as to his true cost of lifetime productivity investments.  Hence, we 
make the assumption that the worker has private information about his specific type.  The worker may 
also gather perfectly observable credentials by engaging in tertiary, or university, education.  The skills 
and habits developed by a high productivity worker reduces his effort cost of obtaining these credentials.  
The relationship between the desired credential and the productivity choice is given by the worker’s 
disutility of effort or cost function.  The payoff to the worker’s chosen credential level, s, as well the 
stereotype, i, is captured by the expected wage function.   
Consider first the worker’s effort cost function.  To simplify the analysis we assume that the 
worker’s type does not directly affect his credential cost.  We then write the cost function as additively 
separable C(, q, s) = I(, q) + c(q, s).  The function c(q, s) isolates the effect of the productivity choice 
on the credential cost and the complementarities between s and q imply that cs(l, ) > cs(h, ) > 0.  The 
function I(,  q) describes the relationship between the worker’s type and his cost of becoming high 
productivity.  The unobservable  indexes the cost of being a high productivity worker, an activity that is 
more costly for higher types: I(, h) > I(, l) ¥ 0.
7  In order to concentrate on the moral hazard in quality 
choice and avoid selection issues, we assume that I(, l) = 0 for all  (and in assumption 3 below we 
assume that a low productivity worker is valuable under certainty).
8  Hence, we can assume without loss 
of generality that I(, h) = .
9  These restrictions on the cost function are assumption 1: 
  I(, h) = θ ¥ I(, l) = 0 for all , cqs(·, ·) < 0 ≤ css(q,  ·).      (1) 
                                                      
7 We follow the convention that a subscript refers to the partial derivative of the function with respect to the 
subscript: I(, q)/  I(, q). 
8 Weaker restrictions can be made.  If the expected wage for a low productivity worker is greater than the cost for 
the highest type, then our results hold under the more general ordering: I(, h) > I(, l) and I(, h) > I(, l)  0.   
9 In particular, we will look for a critical type, θ
H, that is just indifferent between choosing high and low 
productivity.  For any increasing function I(θ, h), we can then write ܨ ෨(θ
H) = F(I
-1(θ
H, h)).     
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  Assumption 1 captures the following idea.  A lower type worker may choose higher productivity 
since it lowers the cost of university credentials.  The firm may thus rationally infer that a higher 
credential is associated with higher unobservable productivity indicating that the worker is a low type. 
  Next consider the firm’s objective.  The firm’s revenue function is v(q, s).  The firm values higher 
productivity (vq(, s) > 0) and weakly prefers more university education (vs(q, ) ¥ 0).  We assume that the 
marginal value of university education is no lower in a high productivity worker (vqs(, ) ¥ 0) and that the 
firm experiences diminishing gains in revenue as higher education is further increased (vss(q, ) § 0).  Of 
course, if university education only serves as a credential, then vqs(, ) = 0.  The firm’s expected revenue 
is:  v
E(s, i) = Eq[v(q, s)] = b(s, i)·v(h, s) + (1  b(s, i))v(l, s).  The variable b(s, i) = Pr(h|i, s) is the firm’s 
posterior belief that the worker is high productivity, conditional on its observation of the worker’s label 
and credentials.  The firm offers a wage (w) to the worker that the worker can accept or reject.  The firm 
chooses the wage to maximize its expected profit function: π = – (v
E – w)
2.  These profit function 
restrictions are assumption 2.  
  vq(, s) > 0, vs(q, ) ¥ 0, vqs(, ) ¥ 0 ¥ vss(q, ), π = – (v
E – w)
2.     (2) 
The firm observes the label and the signal, but not the worker’s type or his unobservable quality 
choice.  Hence, the wage is a function w(s, i) = v
E(s, i).
 10  Given his type and label the worker chooses q 
and then s to maximize his expected utility:  Eu(, i) = Eu(, q(, i), s(, i), i) = E[w(s, i)]  C(, q, s). 
  The timing of the game is as follows.  First the worker receives θ and i.  He then choose q(θ, i) 
and then s(θ, i).  The firm observes s and i and makes an offer w(s, i).  The following assumption 3 says 
that under certainty a low productivity worker is valuable and along with assumptions 1 and 2 it ensures 
                                                      
10 We could also assume that there are at least two firms who bid for the worker and we would obtain all of the same 
results, however, we would need to modify the model so that there is more than one receiver of the signal.  Either 
formulation ensures that the worker has monopoly power.  Giving the worker monopoly power yields a 
straightforward division of the gains from trade.  Other specifications are, of course, possible, however, as long as 
they allow the worker to retain some of the surplus he creates by being high productivity, these alternative 
specifications do not change our results.  Furthermore, by assuming that the firm bids for the worker we rule out the 
possibility of price or wage signaling by the worker.  We do not make this assumption to detract from the 
importance of price signaling, but rather to limit our analysis to a one dimensional signal.   
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that the worker is hired.  It also establishes that if the signal is non-dissipative, then under full information 
the worker would choose a finite level of university education. 
  v(l, 0) > c(l, 0) ¥ 0.  If vs(q, ) > 0, then lim sØ¶[vs(q, ) −cs(q, )]  <  0.      (3) 
B.  Description of the Equilibrium 
  A sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) is a collection of strategies and beliefs  
{s(, i), q(, i), w(s, i), b(s, i)} which satisfy the following three conditions.  Sequential rationality for the 
worker and for the firm requires that:  
 { q(, i), s(, i)}  argmaxq,sE[w  C(, q, s) ]          ( E 1 w )  
  w(s, i)  argmaxw – (v
E(s, i) – w)
2.         ( E 1 f )  
  In defining Bayesian beliefs note that s only depends on  through the worker’s choice of q(, i) 
and only depends on i through the stereotype, therefore, we can write s(, i) = s(q(), i) = s(q, i).  
Hence, s(q, i) = argmaxsEu(, q, s, i) so that s(h, i) is the credential chosen by a high productivity 
worker when the equilibrium stereotype is i and s(l, i) is defined similarly.  Bayes-consistency of 
beliefs requires that: 
 If  {s(h, i), i} = {s(l, i), i} then b[s(l, i), i] = i;      (E2bp) 
 If  {s(h, i), i} ≠ {s(l, i), i} then b[s(l, i), i] = 0 and b[s(h, i), i] = 1.      (E2bs) 
  Pooling equilibrium beliefs are described by E2bp, where a high and a low productivity worker 
choose the same credential and the firm learns nothing from the choice.  In a separating equilibrium 
(E2bs) a high and a low productivity worker choose differing credentials and the posterior beliefs 
recognize this separation. 
  As is well known, a sequential equilibrium does not place adequate structure on beliefs off of the 
equilibrium path.  We follow the existing literature in refining the set of sequential equilibrium to only 
include those that have reasonable beliefs.  Although there is no strict consensus on what constitutes 
reasonable beliefs we use the least contentious and least restrictive refinement.  In particular, we restrict   
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the set of sequential equilibrium beliefs to only include those that place zero probability on the event that 
a worker played a strictly dominated strategy.  We use the term credible to describe beliefs and to 
describe equilibria that satisfy this dominance refinement.   
 A  strategy  s is strictly dominated by s if 
' w MinEu(, q, s, i, w) > 
w Max Eu(, q, s, i, w).  
Unfortunately, there is no upper or lower bound on the wage that the firm could offer, therefore, no 
strategy is strictly dominated for either productivity of worker for some belief on the firm’s offered wage.  
Still, sequential rationality for the firm implies that the bounds on the wage they would offer in response 
to any signal level are given by the full information values.  In particular, if we restrict the worker to 
beliefs such that the expected wage w(s, i)  W* = [v(l, s), v(h, s)], we can then define the set of 
productivities, q(s), for who strategy s is not strictly dominated.
11   Our dominance refinement requires 
that after seeing some strategy, s, the firm puts probability on productivity q if and only if s  q(s).  
Put concisely:  
 Define  q(s) = {q(, i) | ~ s satisfying 
'* wW Min
 Eu(, q, s, i, w) > 
* wW Max
 Eu(, q, s, i, w)} 
 Then,  Pr[q(, i)|s] > 0 if and only if s  q(s)       (E2bd) 
Note that we include the posterior belief (through its effect on the firm’s action) in condition (E2bd).   
  The dominance refinement we use is common in the literature.  A condition like E2bd can be 
found in Cho and Kreps (1987, pp. 199-201), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 330), and Mas-Colell et al 
(1995, pp. 468-470) among others.  Some of the literature on signaling games utilizes more powerful 
belief refinements such as the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987), or their stronger D1 which is 
very similar to the divine equilibrium of Banks and Sobel (1987).  These refinements are motivated by the 
                                                      
11 Our refinement and its exposition is based on the section entitled “Domination-Based Refinements of Beliefs” in 
Mas-Colell et al (1995, pp. 468-470).  If instead, as in Mas-Colell et al (1995), we assume that two or more firms 
compete in Bertrand fashion in hiring the worker, then we would need to modify the set W* to only include possible 
equilibrium responses by the firms.  This is because, given an arbitrary belief about the other firm’s wage offer, no 
wage offer is strictly dominated for a firm.  Hence, the assumption of one firm with a quadratic loss payoff function 
mildly simplifies the exposition of this part of the model and has no effect in the remainder.     
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attempt to apply Kohlberg and Merten’s (1986) strategic stability concept to signaling games, and none of 
these stronger ones are universally accepted, even by these original researchers.  For example Cho and 
Kreps (1987, pp. 202-203) state that “Despite the name we have given it, the Intuitive Criterion is not 
completely intuitive.  (It is certainly less intuitive than applications of dominance.)”  They then proceed to 
discuss (p.203) a verbal critique that Joe Stiglitz gave to their proposed refinement.
12  In their conclusion 
(p.215) they continue to discuss the limitation of these stronger refinements when they say, “we do not 
mean to advocate all the tests we have described…the tests we have devised are very powerful in 
applications; perhaps too powerful.”  For their part, Banks and Sobel (1987) do not attempt to provide 
economic intuition for their divine equilibrium.   Our choice of the weaker dominance refinement is not 
only because it is more intuitive and less contentious than the stronger intuitive criterion (let alone D1 or 
divinity), but also because it preserves a subset of the pooling equilibrium (with only two productivities 
the intuitive criterion refines away all but the lowest cost separating equilibrium).  Mailath et al. (1993) 
also express reservations with forward induction refinements, especially when they refine away pooling 
equilibria that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium; therefore, they introduce undefeated 
equilibrium.
13  They also argue that a single solution concept that applies to all games does not exist and 
that different refinements could be employed in the analysis of a single game (p.265).   
  An additional rationale for our use of the weaker dominance refinement is that with three or more 
productivities the intuitive criterion would not remove the multiple pooling equilibria that we describe 
                                                      
12 This critique is described for the beer-quiche example, however, it can be easily applied to a labor market 
signaling game as follows.  When breaking a candidate pooling equilibrium the intuitive criterion looks for a 
deviation from the pooling equilibrium that the high quality would choose if believed to be high quality and that the 
low quality would not mimic. The single-crossing property guarantees that such a deviation exists.  The problem is 
that the low quality does not mimic this deviation because they compare it to their payoff at the proposed but no 
longer valid pooling equilibrium.  If they do not mimic this deviation, however, they no longer receive the pooling 
equilibrium payoff and instead receive the low quality separating payoff.  Being as the refinement presumes forward 
induction, the low quality should foresee this outcome and mimic this deviation.  Hence, such a deviation cannot be 
considered as revealing the high quality and it would not break the proposed pooling equilibrium.   
13 The perfect sequential equilibria of Grossman and Perry (1986) can also be used to justify a deviation to a Pareto 
dominating pooling equilibrium.  Unfortunately, their credible belief restriction also eliminates all pooling 
equilibria; therefore, even in simple signaling models, if the percentage of high quality types is large (so that pooling 
equilibria Pareto dominate the separating equilibria), then a perfect sequential equilibrium may fail to exist.     
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here.
 14  (In fact, in the following section we describe how our model would work with three productivities 
and the intuitive criterion and we then solve for it in a particular example).  Including a third productivity 
introduces some additional notational complexity and introducing it from the outset make the presentation 
less intuitive, therefore, we proceed with two productivities and the more intuitive dominance refinement.  
  The following observation is helpful in defining the third equilibrium condition.  Since the wage 
w(s(q, i), i) = v
E(s(q, i), i) is a function of the stereotype, the productivity decision is also a function 
of i.  Defining 
H as the solution to  
  Eu[
H, h, s(h, i), i]  Eu[, l, s(l, i), i]   =   0 ,          ( 4 )  
it is seen that 
H(i) is indifferent between high and low productivity and is, therefore, the highest  
choosing high productivity and F(
H(i)) is the probability that a worker with label i chooses high 
productivity.  The third equilibrium condition, consistency with a common prior distribution, then 
requires:  
  i = Pr(q=h|i) = Pr(Eu[, h, s(h, i), i] ¥ Eu[, l, s(l, i), i]) = 
  Pr(Eu[, h, s(h, i), i]  Eu[
H, h, s(h, i), i]) =  
  Pr[C(, h, s(h, i))  C(
H(i), h, s(h, i))] = Pr( § 
H(i)) = F(
H(i)),    (E3c) 
so that stereotypes about label i induce the same measure of workers with label i to choose high 
productivity.  Consistency, in this context, is essentially a fixed point argument.  That is, the stereotype is 
an interim belief on productivity choice that is self-fulfilling and is also consistent with the commonly 
known prior distribution of types.    
  The three credible equilibrium conditions can be stated succinctly as follows: a collection of 
strategies {q, s, w}that are best responses given {, i}and the firm’s beliefs, b(s, i); posterior beliefs are 
                                                      
14 The D1 or divine equilibrium concept would eradicate all pooling equilibrium with any number of productivities, 
but as Cho and Kreps (1987, p.215) say, “We ourselves find the D1 test very strong in the context of the Spence 
model”.    
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derived by Bayes’ Rule where applicable and are subject to the dominance refinement at all information 
sets; i = F(
H(i)). 
  Our signaling model differs from the traditional approach in the following respect.  The worker 
chooses his unobservable productivity as well as his observable signal.  The common prior distribution of 
types is, therefore, not over productivity but rather over the investment costs necessary in becoming high 
productivity.  If the worker could not choose his productivity, then there would be one credible separating 
equilibrium and, perhaps, one credible pooling equilibrium.  Consistency with the common prior is 
straightforward in the standard model.  In our model it is the formal statement of this condition that 
allows us to see how multiple credible pooling equilibria may arise in a signaling model.  Before 
considering multiple pooling equilibria we describe the unique credible separating equilibrium. 
C.  Separating Equilibrium. 
  In this section we analyze the unique credible separating equilibrium for this economic 
environment.  As the description of this lowest-cost separating, or Riley (1979), equilibrium has been 
well-described in the literature, we are brief.  Still, it introduce our method of endogenizing the measure 
of high productivity workers.  Furthermore, the payoffs in the credible separating equilibrium affect the 
existence, of multiple credible pooling equilibria and are necessary for the following sections.   
  Figure 1 goes about here. 
  The results of this section are illustrated in figure 1 for the dissipative signal case.  We see there a 
wage function for beliefs that support the separating equilibrium.  The indifference curve for the low 
productivity worker is shown at his full-information utility level.  Where this indifference curve crosses 
the full information wage for the high productivity worker yields the separating signal, s
s.  The 
indifference curve for the high productivity worker is also shown going through this signal level and from 
the single-crossing property in assumption 1 it lies above the low productivity indifference curve at    
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s = 0.
15  The difference in utility levels (as measured on the w axis) yields the critical type for the 
separating equilibrium, θ
HS.  All workers with low costs ( § 
HS) become high productivity.  
  We write the worker’s expected utility as a function of the posterior belief: Eu(, q, s, i, b(s, i)) 
= Eu(, q, s, i).  We define the full-information signals for the high and low productivity as s
h* and s
l*.  
From assumptions 1, 2 and 3 these are non-negative and finite.  In a separating equilibrium a low 
productivity worker does not mimic the high productivity worker’s signal.  The highest signal that the low 
productivity worker would copy, even if believed to be high productivity, is denoted s
s and is given by:  
 Eu[, l, s
s, i, 1] = Eu[, l, s
l*, i,   0 ] .             ( 5 )  
 From  assumptions  1  − 3 the low productivity worker prefer to reveal himself with the full 
information signal, s
l*, instead of any signal s > s
s.  In the typical case s
s > s
h*, and the high productivity 
worker must distort his expenditure to signal his productivity, however, if the low productivity cost is 
much steeper than the high productivity cost, then no distortion is necessary and s
h* ≥ s
s.  Hence, a 
candidate for a credible separating equilibrium is where the high-productivity agent chooses max{s
h*, s
s}.  
To simplify the exposition we make the following assumption 4, which says that the low productivity 
would mimic s
h*, so that s
s > s
h* and we can restrict attention to distortionary signaling equilibria.  This 
assumption follows from the second inequality in equation 6.  The first inequality in equation 6 says that a 
positive measure of types choose high productivity at the least costly distortionary separating equilibrium.   
  Eu[, h, s
s, i, 1] > Eu[, l, s
s, i, 1] < Eu[, l, s
h*, i,   1 ] .       ( 6 )  
  We can now show the following (the proof is in the appendix). 
Proposition 1:  If assumptions 1 – 4 are satisfied, then there exists a unique credible separating 
equilibrium where ρi = F(θ
HS)  (0, 1].  All θ § θ
HS choose {h, s
s} and all θ > θ
HS choose {l, s
l*}.  
D.  Stereotype Threat 
  We now consider pooling equilibria.  In a pooling equilibrium both productivities choose the 
                                                      
15 Ignoring the investment cost and rearranging the expected utility yields the equation for each indifference curve as 
w = ݑ ത + c(q, s).      
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same pooling credential, s
p, therefore, from (E2bp) the posterior beliefs are the same as the prior beliefs 
and the expected wage is the same for either productivity.  The key is that the prior belief is determined 
endogenously by (E3c) and this equilibrium correspondence may have multiple solutions.   
  Figure 2 goes about here.     
  In figure 2 we show the pooling wage function w
p(s
p, i) as increasing in s
p, which is confirmed in 
the proof of proposition 2.  On this wage function we show two pooling equilibria.  The good pooling 
equilibrium requires a higher university education level than does the bad one: s
pg > s
pb.  In both equilibria 
the utility level (as measured along the wage axis) is greater for the high productivity worker, but, 
crucially, this difference is larger for the good equilibrium (because the indifference curves cross the 
wage function further from the wage axis).  Hence, when comparing different pooling equilibria we see 
that a higher pooling signal not only corresponds to a higher wage but also a better stereotype: θ
Hg > θ
Hb.  
The intuition from figure 2 is developed formally in proposition 2. 
Proposition 2:  If assumptions 1 – 4 are satisfied, then: (i) there exists a continuum of pooling sequential 
equilibria; (ii) in each sequential equilibrium the pooling expenditure level is determined uniquely from 
the stereotype; (iii)  pooling sequential equilibria with higher stereotypes require larger pooling 
expenditures and have higher wages.  
Proof:  For pooling equilibria equation (4) takes the following form:  Eu[
H, h, s
p, i] = Eu[, l, s
p, i].  
The expected wage is the same for any worker choosing s
p, therefore, this equation can be rewritten as:  
  
H = κ(s
p) = c(l, s
p) – c(h, s
p) .          ( 7 )  
Solving this equation for ρi yields: 
  ρi = F(
H) = F(κ(s
p) ) .           ( 8 )  
Noting that F(
H) and κ(s
p) are continuous, monotonic functions establishes parts i and ii.  To establish 
part (iii.) totally differentiate (8), and note that F(
H) and κ(s
p) are both strictly increasing:  
  ( ( )) [ ( , ) ( , )] 0
p i






    

.         ( 9 )    
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The wage in a pooling equilibrium is given as  
  w
p(s
p, i) = ρi·v(h, s
p) +(1 – ρi)·v(l, s
p) = v(l, s
p) + F(κ(s
p))·[v(h, s
p) – v(l, s
p)]     (10)  
and its derivative with respect to s











p) – v(l, s
p)] + F(κ(s
p))·[vs(h, s
p) – vs(l, s
p)].    (11) 
The derivative in equation (11) is strictly positive, therefore, w
p(s
p, i) is strictly increasing in s
p and, from 
equation (9), it is also increasing in ρi. Ñ  
  Although there are many correct sequential equilibrium stereotypes, proposition 2 does not 
consider if these beliefs satisfy E2bd and are, therefore, credible.  For example, if s
p = 0, then no type 
chooses high productivity and, therefore, i = 0.  If, however, the investment cost is low for at least one 
type (as given by assumption 4), then that type would deviate to the separating credential and s
p = i = 0 
could not be part of a credible equilibrium.  More generally, for any proposed pooling belief, if either 
productivity prefers his separating equilibrium payoff to that at the proposed pooling equilibrium then he 
would break the pooling equilibria.  Only pooling sequential equilibria that are preferred by both 
productivities are credible.  Whereas a credible separating equilibrium always exists, the same is not 
necessarily true of a credible pooling equilibrium.   
  Figure 3 goes about here. 
  To help understand when a credible pooling equilibrium exists refer to figure 3 where the 
indifference curves for the separating equilibrium as well as two different wage functions for a pooling 
equilibrium are shown.  A credible pooling equilibrium must lie in the shaded area.  Only one of the 
shown pooling wage functions can support a credible pooling equilibrium and a credible pooling 
equilibrium is shown on this wage function.  The lower pooling wage function lies below the shaded area, 
therefore, the high productivity worker would break a pooling equilibrium on this lower wage function.  
Hence, for existence of a credible pooling equilibrium it is necessary that w
p(s
p, i) increases rapidly in s
p.   
  From equation 11 we see that there are four determinants of the effect of the signal on the pooling 
wage function.  First, if the signal is non-dissipative, so that university education is more than just a   
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credential, then the wage increases more rapidly in the pooling education level.  Second, if the value of 
university education is larger in a high productivity worker, then this first effect is magnified.  Third, if 
the signal cost difference, κ(s), is steeper, then the sorting condition is more pronounced and more types 
choose to become high productivity which, in turn, increases the wage.  Fourth, if the distribution 
function increases rapidly, then the wage function will as well.  For example, if most of the types are 
similar, with similar investment costs, then once the lowest type becomes high productivity the rest will 
quickly follow.  Hence,  it appears that if the variance of types is small (in addition to the lowest type 
investment cost), then the wage function will increase rapidly is s
p and a credible pooling equilibrium 
exists.  In the next section we verify this intuition for the Pareto and uniform distributions.   
  The preceding paragraph suggests that, apart from the sorting condition or the non-dissipative 
value of higher education, if the type distribution is sufficiently steep, then a credible pooling equilibrium 
exists.  In particular, if the density is initially large and is non-increasing, then the distribution function 
and the wage function increase rapidly is s
p.  We follow this idea in looking for a single sufficient 
condition for when credible pooling equilibria exist.  To explain this condition, we define  
  σ(θ) ≡ (ln(F'))' = F''/F'          ( 1 2 )  
as the degree of concavity of the distribution.  For two distributions F1 and F2 of the same type, with 
corresponding σ1 and σ2, if σ1(θ) < σ2(θ) < 0 for every θ, then distribution 1 is relatively more concave 
than (and also first-order stochastically dominates) distribution 2.  If σ(θ) <0, then the density function is 
decreasing.  The density (F') is positive, therefore, if it is decreasing, then (ln(F))'' =  2
'' ' ' FFF F
F
  < 0, so that 
σ(θ) <0 is sufficient for the distribution function to be log concave.
16  Formalizing the discussion of the 
previous two paragraphs we now show the following.  (The proof is in the appendix.)    
Proposition 3:  (i.) If assumptions 1  4 are satisfied and if σ(θ) < 0, then there exists a finite k
* > 0 such 
that if σ(θ) ≤ – k
*, then a credible pooling equilibrium exists.  (ii.) A credible pooling equilibrium is more 
                                                      
16 A non-increasing decreasing density and a log concave distribution function are provided by the Pareto, 
exponential, uniform, and Zipf, as well as restricted versions of the Weibull, power, beta, gamma, chi-squared, 
truncated normal, and log-normal distributions.  For more on log-concave distributions see Bagnoli and Bergstrom 
(2005).  For more on the Pareto and Zipf distributions see Axtell (2001).   
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likely to exist, and the measure of credible pooling equilibria is larger if the signal is non-dissipative, if 
its added value for a high productivity worker is larger, or if its cost function for the low productivity 
worker is relatively steeper.  (iii.) The most pessimistic stereotype, s
p = ρi = 0, is never part of a credible 
pooling equilibrium.     
  An important corollary of proposition 3 is that if a credible pooling equilibrium exists for some 
θ
H(s
p), then credible pooling equilibria exist in the neighborhood of this θ
H(s
p).  This result is immediate 
because of the continuity of the wage function (which is given by the assumed continuity of the 
distribution, value and cost functions).  Hence, combining this multiplicity of pooling equilibria with the 
results of proposition 2 which provides a rationale for ranking pooling equilibrium allows us to speak of 
self-fulfilling statistical discrimination, or stereotype threat, in labor market signaling models. 
17 
Corollary 1:  Credible self-fulfilling statistical discrimination equilibria exist in signaling models with an 
endogenous productivity choice. 
  A second important corollary of proposition 3 relates the concavity of the distribution to its 
variance.  For the Pareto distribution σ(θ) =  (1 ) k

  , where k  is the shape parameter and for the 
exponential distribution σ(θ) = – k, where k is the rate.  Hence, credible pooling equilibria exist for the 
Pareto and exponential distributions when the shape (or rate) is greater than a specific level that depends 
on the model parameters.
 18  The variance for both of these distributions is a function of this k parameter 
and in both cases it is decreasing in k.  The variance of the Pareto distribution is [k(θmin)2]/[(k – 2)(k – 1)2] 
which is infinite for k = 1 or 2 and is otherwise decreasing in k and the variance of the exponential 
                                                      
17 Although one pooling equilibrium may Pareto dominate another pooling equilibrium they are both credible if they 
both Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.  This occurs because when starting from one equilibrium, the firm 
may have beliefs about other pooling education levels so that neither productivity (nor underlying type) is playing a 
strictly dominated strategy in the original Pareto dominated pooling equilibrium. 
18 The figures for the paper were drawn for the case of a Pareto distribution: F ˆ ()   = 1 –  ˆ (/)
k   , where θ = 1.  
Furthermore, v(h, s) = 2, v(l, s) = 1, c(q, s) = s
2/v(q, s), and I(θ, h) = θ – 1.  In figure 3, the only difference between 
the two drawn pooling wage functions is the shape parameter k.  The Zipf distribution is a special case of the Pareto 
distribution with k = 1; however, if the signal is valuable enough to the firm then by proposition 3 credible pooling 
equilibria exist for the Zipf distribution as well.     
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distribution is 1/k
2 which is decreasing in k.  Combining these facts with proposition 3 and corollary 1 we 
can now state the following.   
Corollary 2:  If assumptions 1-4 hold and the distribution is Pareto or exponential, then credible 
stereotype threat occurs when the variance of the distribution of types is below a critical level.  The 
measure of credible pooling equilibria is larger if the variance is smaller, if the signal is non-dissipative, 
if its added value for a high productivity worker is greater, or if its cost function for the low productivity 
worker is relatively steeper.  
  Corollary 2 indicates that stereotype threat is more likely if there is little difference between the 
types.  In this case the label is a useful heuristic device.  On the other hand, if there is more dispersion in 
the types, then the label is less meaningful and self-fulfilling reputations are less likely to occur.   
  Proposition 3 is a relatively weak sufficient condition.  For example, the uniform distribution, like 
the exponential and Pareto distributions is log concave with a weakly log-convex density, however, the 
uniform density is non-decreasing so that σ(θ) = 0.  Still credible pooling equilibria do exist for the 
uniform distribution.  In particular, let v(h, s) = 2, v(l, s) = 1, c(q, s) = s/v(q, s), I(θ, h) = θ, and θ ~ U[0, a].  




H/a +(a − θ
H)/a = 1 + s
p/2a.  A credible pooling equilibrium requires that 
1 + s
p/2a − s
p/2 ≥ 3/2.  Rearranging this expression and noting that s
p < 1 = s
s yields 1 > s
p ≥ a/(1 – a).  
Hence, credible pooling equilibria exist for a <  ½ .   F u r t h e r m o r e ,  θ
H = s
p/2 is bounded above by a, 
therefore, the interval of credible pooling signals is 2a > s
p ≥ a/(1 – a).  The size of this interval as a 
percentage all pooling signals is [2a −a/(1 – a)]/a = 2 – 1/(1 – a), which is decreasing in a.  If a is near ½, 
then the percent of credible s
p  is small.  If a is reduced to zero, then the percent of credible s
p is 
maximized.  Finally, note that the variance of this uniform distribution is a
2/12, so that the measure of 
credible pooling equilibria is decreasing in the variance of the distribution of types.   
  It is interesting to note that Spence (1973) claims that a type of statistical discrimination can 
occur in his seminal work on market signaling.  In his paper, firms may discriminate against women by 
requiring a much higher level of the separating expenditure for women than for men.  In this case, women   
  19
would pool (and obtain less education) while men separate.  For example, a woman with seven PhDs 
could be believed to be low quality if separating beliefs require at least eight.  The firm’s non-credible 
beliefs are not tested and are correct in a sequential equilibrium, however, they require the firm to believe 
that low-quality women would play a strictly dominated strategy.  Furthermore, these non-credible beliefs 
do not affect the proportion of high-quality women and, therefore, they are not truly self-fulfilling.  An 
important contribution of our model is showing that statistical discrimination in a signaling model can 
occur, however, it requires agents to have an endogenous quality choice.   
E.  Counter-Stereotypical Behaviour. 
  We now consider some properties of the set of credible pooling equilibria.  Referring again to 
figure 3 we see that, if the wage function is quasiconcave, then the set of credible pooling equilibria is 
compact.  In particular, there is a compact continuous set of education levels and resulting pooling wages 
such that the indifference curves through this wage lie above the indifference curves for the separating 
equilibrium.  Note, as well, that the indifference curve for the high productivity worker lies above that for 
the low productivity worker.  Hence, it is always the high productivity worker who would choose to break 
a non-credible pooling equilibrium.  In proposition 4 we show that the set of credible pooling equilibria is 
compact, and it is always the lowest types who would break a non-credible low pooling equilibria by 
separating as a high productivity worker.   
Proposition 4:  If assumptions 1 – 4 are satisfied, then the following hold.  (i.) The set of credible pooling 
equilibria stereotypes is compact.  (ii.)  Any type that would break a low non-credible low-stereotype 
pooling equilibrium would separate as a high productivity worker.  (iii.)  For any non-credible pooling 
equilibrium, there is a continuum of the lowest types starting at θ that would deviate to the high 
productivity outcome in the separating equilibrium.  (iv.)  All credible pooling equilibria generate a 
weakly lower probability of a high productivity worker than does the separating equilibrium. 
  The proof to proposition 4 is in the appendix.  Parts (i.) and (iii.) of proposition 4 show that the 
set of credible pooling equilibria is a compact set and adjacent to this set there is another compact set of   
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non-credible pooling equilibria that begins with the most pessimistic stereotype.  (There may also exist 
another set of very optimistic non-credible pooling stereotypes that are less interesting.)  Dividing the set 
of pooling sequential equilibria allows us to concentrate on the more important parts (ii.) and (iv.) of 
proposition 4.  In particular, low types are the ones that would break a pessimistic non-credible pooling 
equilibrium by choosing high productivity and the separating expenditure.  Part (ii.) shows that all of 
these low types separate to high productivity.  Part (iv.) shows that although credible pooling equilibria 
may be preferred by all types, they still generate a lower probability of a high productivity worker than 
does the separating equilibrium.   
  Part (ii.) of proposition 4 also introduces the idea of counter-stereotypical behaviour.  Whereas 
moderately discriminatory beliefs can hurt a group, very discriminatory beliefs can serve as an impetus 
for the more capable in that group to distinguish themselves and separate.  For example, the bad pooling 
equilibrium shown in figure 3 has very low and non-credible beliefs.  Foreseeing this very discriminatory 
equilibrium the lowest types separate and a worker with this label results in a separating equilibrium.  
Hence, a higher percentage of this discriminated against group attains a high level of university education 
and this high level is larger than that obtained by a worker with a label that does not suffer any initial 
discrimination.  In this way non-credible pooling beliefs generate counter-stereotypical behaviour.  In the 
next section we introduce additional productivity choices and we see how stereotype threat may exist 
along with counter-stereotypical behaviour. 
III.  Stereotype Threat, Counter-Stereotypical Behaviour, and the Intuitive Criterion.  
  In this section we first consider three productivities and then we use the more restrictive belief 
refinement given by the intuitive criterion.  To be concrete, assumption 5 is that there are three 
productivities: low, high, and very high and that the investment cost is larger for a very high than for a 
high productivity worker.   
A.  Stereotype Threat and Counter-Stereotypical Behaviour. 
  In figure 4 we show stereotype threat and counter-stereotypical behaviour occurring at the same 
time.  In addition to the three indifference curves we show three pooling wage functions.  The bottom   
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wage function is when low and high pool.  The top two are when all three productivities pool.  Consider 
first the topmost wage function.  This wage function crosses the separating indifference curve for the very 
high productivity at the point labeled on the s axis as s
c(l, h, vh).  All pooling education levels that are 
between this intersection and where this pooling wage function crosses the low productivity indifference 
curve are credible, therefore, stereotype threat with three productivities can occur.  For all pooling 
education levels that are below s
c(l, h, vh) the very high productivity worker would separate.  If the 
pooling education level was still greater than s
c(l, h), then pooling for the low and high productivity 
would still be part of a credible equilibrium.  In this way the stereotype threat remains while counter-
stereotypical behaviour occurs simultaneously.   
  Figure 4 goes about here. 
  The middle pooling wage function shown (with a thinner line) in figure 4 could occur, for 
example, if the very high investment cost function was relatively steeper.
19  A smaller measure of types, 
therefore, become very high productivity for any university education level and the pooling wage function 
reflects their reduced number.  What is interesting about this middle pooling wage function is that the 
minimum university education that is part of a credible three-way pooling equilibrium is greater than that 
for the higher pooling wage function.  In this case, there are a greater measure of credible equilibria 
whereby stereotype threat and counter-stereotypical behaviour occur simultaneously.   
B.  Stereotype Threat and the Intuitive Criterion.   
  We now consider the intuitive criterion.  In our model, as in a standard signaling model with 
more than two productivities, the intuitive criterion (and equilibrium dominance) does not eradicate all 
pooling equilibria.  Hence, stereotype threat and counter-stereotypical behaviour are shown to exist in a 
signaling model even when beliefs must satisfy the intuitive criterion.   
  The intuitive criterion proceeds by first looking for signals that are equilibrium dominated for a 
particular productivity.  That is, an alternative signal, s', is equilibrium dominated for productivity q' if the 
                                                      
19 Building on the example described in footnote 19, we add v(vh, s) = 3 and I(θ, vh) = x(θ – 1), for x > 1 to create 
the graphs in this section.  The two top pooling wage functions are for differing values of x.    
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payoff at the proposed equilibrium is larger than the maximum payoff that could be obtained by s'.  Note 
that the equilibrium payoff is generally higher than the minimum payoff considered in E2bd, so that 
equilibrium dominance will prune more signals for productivity q'.  If s' is equilibrium dominated for q' 
we then eradicate q' as a possible sender of s' and consider the minimum payoff to s' if the receiver 
believes the sender is a remaining type (for whom s' is not equilibrium dominated).  With only two 
productivities, if a signal, s', is equilibrium dominated for the low productivity worker then beliefs must 
ascribe probability one to the event that it was sent by a high productivity worker and the minimum 
payoff to the sender of s' must reflect these beliefs.  With two productivities this test amounts to looking 
for a signal that, even when believed to come from the high-productivity worker, is equilibrium 
dominated for the low-productivity worker, but not for the high-productivity worker.  The single-
crossing-property ensures that starting from any pooling equilibrium such a signal can always be found.   
  With three productivities, however, equilibrium dominance does not have as much bite.  For 
example, suppose that the low and high productivity workers pool at s
plh, but the very high productivity 
worker separates at s
vhs.  The maximum response to a signal s' is that it came from a very high and not just 
a high productivity worker.  In figure 5 we show the minimum signal that is equilibrium dominated for 
the low productivity as s
0.  It is given by the intersection of the low productivity indifference curve 
(through the conjectured pooling equilibrium) with the full information wage for the very high 
productivity worker.  If the low productivity worker is pruned from the set of possible senders, then the 
minimum response to s
0 is that came from a high, but not a very high, productivity worker.  Drawing the 
high productivity indifference curve though this minimum response to s
0 we see that s
0 is then dominated 
by the equilibrium payoff for the high type as well.  Hence, in this case, the set of equilibria where the 
low and high productivities pool (as in the previous section) and the very high productivity separates 
satisfies the intuitive criterion.   
  Figure 5 goes about here. 
  Each additional productivity requires solving for an additional critical type.  With three 
productivities (where low and high pool) we need to find the critical θ
VH (with corresponding belief ߩ௜
௏ு)   
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that is just indifferent between separating as a very high productivity worker and pooling as a high 
productivity worker.  This critical θ
VH along with θ
























plh)].        (13)  
  The additional constraint given by equilibrium dominance is as follows.  We first define s
0 as the 
minimum signal that that is equilibrium dominated for the low productivity worker.  Next, we check if the 
high productivity worker would deviate and send s
0 if believed to be a high, but not a very high, 
productivity worker.  If not, then the proposed pooling equilibrium satisfies equilibrium dominance and 
the intuitive criterion.  These two conditions are: 
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plh)].   (14) 
  Referring to figure 5 we see that if the full information value of the very high productivity worker 
is sufficiently greater than that of the high productivity worker, or if the sorting condition between the low 
and high productivity is less pronounced, then the condition in equation (14) is more easily satisfied and 
stereotype threat that satisfies the intuitive criterion is more likely to exist.  We develop this intuition 
formally in proposition 5.  (The proof is in the appendix.)  
Proposition 5:  If assumptions 1−5 are satisfied, then multiple self-fulfilling statistical discrimination 
equilibria that satisfy the intuitive criterion exist in signaling models with an endogenous productivity 
choice.  They are more likely to exist if the full information value of the very high productivity worker is 
sufficiently greater than that of the high productivity worker, or if the sorting condition between the low 
and high productivity is less pronounced. 
  It is possible that with three or more productivities equilibrium dominance is no more restrictive 
than dominance.  For example,  reconsider the simple example given in section II.D. after corollary 2 and 
add a third productivity: v(vh, s) = 3, v(h, s) = 2, v(l, s) = 1, c(q, s) = s/v(q, s), I(θ, vh) = 8θ, I(θ, h) = θ, 
                                                      
20 Note that because 
VH < 








ு].  Hence, neither the 
critical (nor any other) very-high productivity worker will wish to act as a low productivity worker.   
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and θ ~ U[0, a].  As noted above, credible pooling equilibria with two productivities only exist if a < ½, 
therefore, let a = ¼.  The critical θ







p/2.  The 
separating s
vhs = 3 and the pooling wage is w
p = (a + θ
H − 2θ
V)/(a – θ
VH).  Substitution yields:   
θ
VH = (7 + 2s
p)/56 ± ◊[(7 + 2s
p)
2/16 − 28(¼ − 3s
p/8)]/14.  Taking the smaller root of this quadratic and 
substituting into w
p yields the pooling wage function.  This pooling wage function crosses the high 
productivity separating indifference curve from below at .39.  Naturally, θ
H is bounded above by a = ¼, 
therefore, s
p is bounded above by ½ in this example.  Hence, all s
p œ (.39, .5) can be part of a credible 
pooling equilibrium.  At a pooling signal of s
p = 2/5 we have that θ
H = 1/5 and θ
VH = .0677679.  The 
resulting pooling wage is w
p = 1.72562.  The maximized value of utility for the low, high and very-high 
productivity workers are 1.32562, 1.52562 −  θ, and 2 − 8 θ, therefore, this equilibrium satisfies the 
dominance refinement.  The minimum signal that is equilibrium dominated for the low productivity is s
0 
= 1.67438.  If the low productivity worker is removed as a possible sender of s
0, then the minimum wage 
to a sender of s
0 is v
h = 2.  The resulting payoff to the high productivity sender of s
0 is 1.16281 – θ < 
1.52562 – θ, therefore, s
0  is equilibrium dominated for the high productivity worker even after low 
productivity has been omitted as a possible sender.  Hence, this equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion 
and by continuity so do nearby pooling equilibria.  In fact, for this simple example all pooling equilibria 
that satisfy our dominance refinement in E2bd also satisfy equilibrium dominance in equation (14).   
  It would be straightforward to introduce additional productivities so that stereotype threat and 
counter-stereotypical behaviour exist simultaneously even when beliefs are subject to the intuitive 
criterion.  For example, with four productivities a situation similar to that shown in figure 4 could occur.  
In particular, the highest separates and the bottom three pool when the stereotype is good, but when the 
stereotype is bad the second highest also separates leaving just the bottom two to pool.  To go further with 
this idea, with five productivities (numbered in order of productivity from one to five) it is possible that 
the highest separates, the two lowest (one and two) pool, and the next two (three and four) separate or 
pool depending on the stereotype for their label.  In particular, depending on the type distribution, and the 
value and cost functions, a low pooling equilibrium may be credible for productivities one and two but 
not for three and four (or vice versa).  In this case, productivity four could engage in counter-stereotypical   
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behaviour while productivities one and two from the same label still suffer from stereotype threat.  Other 
variations are possible.  As it is beyond the scope of this paper, we leave this topic for further research.  
IV.  Conclusion  
  We introduce stereotype threat in a signaling model.  The novel feature of our model is that we 
allow the worker to choose his productivity, but we tie this choice to a cost which is given by his 
unobservable type.  It is this additional choice which gives rise to multiple pooling equilibria.  The 
existence of multiple equilibria, which generate a stereotype threat effect, is shown to depend on the 
shape and variance of the distribution of types, the value of the signal, and the strength of the sorting 
condition.  They are more likely if there is less variance in the types, if the signal has more value to the 
firm, or if the single-crossing-property is more pronounced.  We also show that a very bad stereotype 
forces the high productivity worker with that bad stereotype to separate and, thereby, engage in counter-
stereotypical behaviour.  In this way the high productivity worker from a very discriminated against label 
overtakes a complacent pooling worker with a good stereotype label.  We extend our model to three 
productivities and show that stereotype threat can exist when beliefs are subject to the intuitive criterion.  
  The strategic response to discrimination that exists in our model is a novel explanation for why 
high-ability members of some immigrant (or other potentially discriminated against) groups receive more 
education than native born citizens.  Of course, it is only for groups that would suffer a very low 
stereotype in the absence of separation.  The theory presented here, therefore, posits that groups engaging 
in counter-stereotypical behaviour would see greater income disparity.  With two productivities this result 
is straightforward because there is no pooling level of education for these groups – they either obtain a 
high or a low separating level.  With three or more productivities the intuition is the same even if a subset 
of the pooling equilibria remain.   
  There are two important extensions that can be made to our model.  The first is a more complete 
analysis of counter-stereotypical behaviour with several productivities and with investment costs that 
differ across groups.  The idea is to more closely capture the empirical evidence on earnings, race, and 
performance on the AFQT that is reported in Neil and Johnson (1996) and Lang and Manove (2011).  The   
  26
second extension uses our model of statistical discrimination to analyze anti-discrimination and 
affirmative action policies.  As opposed to Coate and Loury (1993) who consider affirmative action in a 
model with noisy information about worker productivity, in our model the firm can perfectly observe the 
worker’s credential choice and a high productivity worker may separate.  Hence, in addition to analyzing 
the effect of affirmative action on statistical discrimination in pooling equilibria, we can also analyze how 
it creates incentives and disincentives for counter-stereotypical separation.     
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1:   
By assumptions 1 − 3 the full information signals, s
l* and s
h*, are finite, unique and s
l* ≤ s
h*.  Similarly  
s
lh* = argmax {Eu[, l, s, i, 1]} is unique.  Note that s
l* ≤ s
lh* ≤ s
h*, and Eu[, l, s, i, 1] is strictly 
decreasing for s > s
lh*.  Hence, Eu[, l, s
lh*, i, 1] ≥ Eu[, l, s
l*, i, 1] ≥ Eu[, l, s
l*, i, 0].  By continuity of 
Eu[, l, s, i] in s there, therefore, exists a s
s > s
lh* such that Eu[, l, s
s, i, 1] = Eu[, l, s
l*, i, 0] and for all 
s > s
s it is the case that Eu[, l, s, i, 1] < Eu[, l, s
l*, i, 0].  Hence all s > s
s, are strictly dominated 
strategies for the low-productivity worker for any posterior beliefs.  Hence, a belief Pr(h|s ¥ s
s) < 1 does 
not satisfy (E2bD).  Furthermore, a posterior belief Pr(h|s) = 1 for some s < s
s causes the low quality 
worker to deviate to s.  If there are posterior beliefs such that s
s is not a dominated strategy for the high 
productivity worker then there is an equilibrium where credible posterior beliefs are Pr(h|s < s
s) = 0 and 
the low productivity worker’s best response is s
l*.   
  We now show that if the posterior beliefs are Pr(h|s < s
s) = 0, Pr(h|s ¥ s
s) = 1, then a high 
productivity worker’s unique best response is s





h*.  We want to show that Eu[, h, s
s, i, 1] > Eu[, h, s
hl*, i, 0], which is equivalent to  
Eu[, h, s
s, i, 1] – Eu[, h, s
hl*, i, 0] > 0 = Eu[, l, s
s, i, 1] – Eu[, l, s
l*, i,  0]     
 v
E(h, s
s) – C(, h, s
s) – v
E(l, s
hl*) + C(, h, s
hl*) > v
E(h, s
s) – C(, l, s
s) – v
E(l, s
l*) + C(, l, s
l*) 
 C(, l, s
s) – C(, h, s
s) > v
E(l, s
hl*) – C(, h, s
hl*) – v
E(l, s
l*) + C(, l, s
l*)       
Now, the right-hand side of the last inequality is greater than  
v
E(l, s
l*) – C(, h, s
l*) – v
E(l, s
l*) + C(, l, s
l*) = C(, l, s
l*) – C(, h, s
l*).     
Hence, for a high productivity worker, s
s dominates all lower s if  
C(, l, s
s) – C(, h, s
s) > C(, l, s
l*) – C(, h, s
l*)    C(, l, s
s) – C(, l, s
l*) > C(, h, s
s) – C(, h, s
l*), 
which is true by assumption 1.   
  Finally note that that Eu[
H, h, s
s, i, 1] = Eu[, l, s
l*, i, 0] and for all θ < θ
H, Eu[, h, s
s, i, 1] > 
Eu[, l, s
l*, i, 0]; therefore, all θ  [θ, θ
H] choose h.  For θ > θ
H, Eu[, h, s
s, i, 1] < Eu[, l, s
l*, i, 0]; 
therefore, all θ  (θ
H,θ], choose l.Ñ      
  28
Proof of Proposition 3:  (i.) In a credible pooling equilibria no productivity would deviate to the 
separating signal.  Given that the productivity choices have been made and the investment cost have been 




p))) – c(q, s
p) ¥ Max {Eu[θ, h, s
s, i, 1] + I(θ, h), Eu[θ, l, s
l*, i, 0]}  .  (A1) 




p))) ≥ c(q, s
p) + Max {Eu[θ, h, s
s, i, 1] + I(θ, h), Eu[θ, l, s
l*, i, 0]}     (A2) 
and we note that the right-hand side of (A2) is the separating equilibrium indifference curves.   From 
assumption 4 we have that Eu[θ, h, s
s, i, 1] + I(θ, h) > Eu[θ, l, s
l*, i, 0], therefore, we require that the 
wage function lies above the separating equilibrium indifference curve for the high productivity worker.  
  From assumption 4, if s
p is close enough to s
h* (which is less than s
s) and if ρi is close enough to 
one, then at least θ prefers the pooling equilibrium.  If, in addition, σ(θ) is sufficiently negative, then the 
entire distribution converges to a mass point at θ, the correct stereotype approaches one and all types 
prefer the pooling equilibrium.  For any two distributions, if σ1(θ) < σ2(θ) for all θ, then F1(·) first-order 
stochastically dominates F2(·), therefore, for any s
p we have that ρi = F(κ(s
p) is increasing in the degree of 
concavity of the distribution.  Finally, note from equation (11) that w
p(s
p, i) is increasing faster in s
p when 
σ(θ) is lower.  Hence, there exists a k
* > 0 such that if σ(θ) < – k
*, then F(κ(s
p)) is sufficiently large and 
equation (A1) holds as a strict inequality for some θ
H > θ.   
  (ii.)  From equation (11) which is the derivative of the left-hand side of equation (A2) we see that 
the wage function is increasing faster in s
p when vs(q, s
p), F'(κ(s
p)), κ'(s
p), or vqs(q, s
p) is larger.   
  (iii.)  Note from assumption 4 that Eu[, h, s
s, i, 1] > Eu[, l, s
s, i, 1] = Eu[, l, 0, 0, 0] so that at 
least θ would break the most pessimistic pooling equilibria.Ñ   
Proof of Proposition 4:  The right-hand side of equation (A2) is the sum of convex functions and is also 
convex.  From equation (11) we see that the left-hand side is increasing and is, therefore, quasiconcave.  
Hence, the set of s
p that satisfy (A2) is a compact set.  (If there are no credible pooling equilibria, then this 
set is empty, which is also compact.)   
 ( ii.) A low non-credible pooling stereotype must have s
p < s
s, therefore, the high productivity   
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separating-equilibrium indifference curve lies above the low productivity one at this low pooling s
p.  
Hence, any θ that prefers to separate will choose high productivity.   
 ( iii.)  This part is immediate from part (ii.) above and from proposition 1.   
 ( iv.)  The maximal element of the set of credible pooling equilibria is s
s, therefore, in a credible 
pooling equilibrium s
p § s
s.  Denote the indifferent type in a separating and in a pooling equilibrium as 
θ
HS(s) and θ
HP(s).  For any s, θ
HP(s) = κ(s) < κ(s) + v(h, s) – v(l, s) = θ
HS(s) and by assumptions 1 and 2 
both κ(s) and v(h, s) – v(l, s) are increasing in s.  Hence, for s
p § s















any equilibrium where there is a positive probability of a high productivity worker.  Hence if  










0) = 1]       (A3) 
then both parts of equation (15) are satisfied.  We can rewrite (A3) as  
  v(vh, s
0) – c(l, s
0) > v(h, s
0) – c(h, s
0) – θ, which is the same as 
  v(vh, s
0) – v(h, s
0) > c(l, s
0) – c(h, s
0) – θ. Ñ  
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Figure 5:Stereotype Threat and the Intuitive Criterion
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